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ABSTRACT
Although California’s redevelopment law is among the strictest in the
nation, from a layperson’s perspective, redevelopment agencies (RDAs) appear to
be no more obstructed from their projects in California as they would be in, say,
Connecticut. This article addresses a sort of “tragedy of the commons” problem
applied to redevelopment: If redevelopment powers are “over-harvested” such as
to instigate serious political revolt against them, they will become barren and
useless, and will no longer be available for the purposes for which they were
intended and for which they are still needed. Even assuming that redevelopment
is efficacious and necessary, redevelopment law ought not be made impotent. In
a post-Kelo society, redevelopment finds itself in danger of being neutered of its
ability to do what it is truly meant to do: to overcome market failure in urban
areas and restore and preserve the vitality of our communities. If redevelopment
agencies abuse their powers by manipulating the market rather than facilitating it,
they expose themselves to political attack in an already volatile property rights
climate. We are in need of reform that reminds RDAs why they exist in the first
place: as market-facilitators, not revenue-generators.
The problem cannot be properly addressed at the local level. In the
example of 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, it became
clear that unscrupulous businesses will employ hostage-taker strategies to capture
the RDA’s eminent domain power. Cities are left resorting to economicallycogent-yet-legally-pathetic claims such as “future blight” in order to appease “800
pound gorillas” like Costco or Wal-Mart. Thus it is not enough for local
governments to self-regulate their use of eminent domain; the regulation must
come from without. Because an ill-conceived redevelopment regime allows rentseekers to blackmail cities, and because it entices cities to use coercive bargaining
and offend landowners’ sensibilities, RDAs are in danger of ruining the tools it
needs to achieve their true purpose of blight removal. Thus without careful
review, RDAs threaten to kill the golden goose.
The solution lies in removing the blight from our redevelopment law, and
in redeveloping the motivation that drives our redevelopment agencies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Good redevelopment might be good policy, depending on whom you ask.
Propertarians might concede nothing when it comes to the value in governmentinitiated redevelopment. But when it comes to bad redevelopment, well, it’s just
plain bad—there’s no dressing it up.

Bad redevelopment takes our homes,

churches, and businesses, robs our schools of funds, and sinks our cities and
towns into unfathomable debt.1 Worst of all, it exists to serve businesses with
deep pockets rather than the general welfare.2
But bad redevelopment is not only bad for citizens, it is bad for California
redevelopment agencies. A bad redevelopment structure dooms agencies into a
self-perpetuating chasm of impropriety,3 debt,4 blackmail,5 and public scorn.6
Bad redevelopment policy turns otherwise good city council members into
ineffective, incompetent, or crooked redevelopment board members—any
positive effects resulting from such a system could only be pure coincidence.
Worst of all, a bad redevelopment structure creates a hostile environment for
redevelopment in general—even good redevelopment.

1

Redevelopment: The Unknown Government, Municipal Officials for Redevelopment
Reform, 2006, at 11 [hereinafter MORR Report] (“Redevelopment agencies are debt machines
that have amassed over $61 billion in statewide bonded indebtedness.”).
2
This article will explain not only why this is true, but that, since the public has come to
perceive it as true, the actual verifiability of the claim is largely irrelevant.
3
See infra Part V (discussing one response by the California legislature to redevelopment
agencies’ tendency to abuse their powers).
4
MORR Report, supra note 1 (“Debt is not just a temptation. It is a requirement.”).
5
See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing how Costco forced the City of Lancaster’s hand into
condemning a profitable 99 Cents Only store).
6
See infra Part IV.A (discussing the public’s response to the current redevelopment
schema).
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This article sets out the relevant California law that defines redevelopment
agencies (RDAs) and grants the awesome power of eminent domain.7 California
law purports to put strict limits on RDAs by requiring findings of physical and
economic blight. However, the statutes are often ambiguously or loosely drafted
so as to provide RDAs some play in the joints. The article will then discuss how
courts have treated the removal of market obstacles like blight, from the removal
of oligopolies8 to physical and economic blight,9 to finally the federal standard
that economic revitalization alone is sufficient to justify the use eminent
domain.10 Although some commentators urge that we have little to worry from
the Supreme Court’s vacuous public use standard set forth in Kelo v. City of New
London,11 California’s friendly tax increment financing structure encourages
RDAs to redevelop as much as possible, and thus to use the ambiguities in
California’s community redevelopment law (CRL) and the courts’ legislative

7

“Eminent domain—the government's authority to force a property owner to sell his or
her land to the government for ‘just compensation’—has long been regarded as one of the most
jarring and intrusive of government's powers.” Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will
Citizens Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform? 707 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 2006),
available at SL049 ALI-ABA 703 (Westlaw). “[E]minent domain [is] a legal term meaning ‘we
can do anything we want.’” Steve Lopez, In the Name of Her Father, TIME, July 14, 1997, at 4.
Eminent domain is the state’s “most awesome grant of power” to municipalities. See City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 419 (1985).
8
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984).
9
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
10
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
11
See Bruce Tepper, The Weight of Kelo, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Mar 29, 2006, at 3738.
Since the Court specifically acknowledged that California has carefully limited
the exercise of eminent domain to make sure that the type of taking that
occurred in New London does not occur in California, one must question
whether the recent push for redevelopment reform is grounded in sound policy
and logic or is actually more opaque.
Id.
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This article will then discuss some landmark

California cases that illustrate the lengths to which RDAs will go to circumvent
the CRL blight requirements. These cases also illustrate the danger to which a
bad redevelopment structure exposes RDAs when it inspires unscrupulous rentseekers, lusting for the benefits of eminent domain, to hold cities’ tax revenues
hostage by threatening to relocate. For all these reasons, redevelopment abuse in
California is rampant,12 despite the fact that California’s redevelopment law
provides one of the strictest blight requirements in the nation. If this regime is
permitted to continue, it will lead to real difficulties for land use planning in
California.

II. CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT LAW
A. Structure and Authority of the Redevelopment Agencies
California Health & Safety Code § 33100 provides that “[t]here is in each
community a public body, corporate and politic, known as the redevelopment
agency of the community.”13

Redevelopment agencies are thus created and

operated without a vote of the citizens affected. In California, 386 cities out of a
total 478 operate their own RDA.14 The RDA’s powers are vested in its current
members,15 which consist of five resident electors of the community, and may be

12

See Sandefur, supra note 7, at 736.
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33100 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
14
MORR Report, supra note 1, at 2.
15
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33121 (West 2006).
13
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increased to seven upon adoption of an ordinance by the city council.16 The
members may not be elective officers or employees of the city.17

The

redevelopment agency board members sit for four year terms,18 and aside from
the appointment of the first RDA chairman,19 the board is mostly autonomous,
and will subsequently elect its own chairman from among its members.20 Fiscal
overhead includes board members’ “actual and necessary expenses,” including
travel expenses, and other legislatively prescribed compensation.21 Although this
compensation structure appears innocuous, fiscal year 2003-04 saw a $580
million expenditure on redevelopment administration.22 This accounted for 11%
of the $5.3 billion thatCalifornia redevelopment age ncies spent that year.23
These RDAs are given the power to “redevelop,” which is
the planning, development, replanning, redesign, clearance,
reconstruction, or rehabilitation, or any combination of these, of all
or part of a survey area, and the provision of those residential,
commercial, industrial, public, or other structures or spaces as may

16

Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33110 (West 2006).
Id. § 33111.
18
Id.
19
Id. § 33113.
20
Id. § 33113.
21
Id. § 33114.
22
MORR Report, supra note 1, at 20. “This provides a lucrative bureaucratic base that
redevelopment staffers seek to preserve and expand.” Id. If section 33115, providing for removal
of RDA board members for inefficiency, is effective at all, it is apparently impotent in the face of
the titanic RDA expenditures. RDAs also contribute public monies to private groups that tout the
advantages of redevelopment. Two Groups Supported by LB Tax Dollars Work to Weaken or
Defeat Homeowner Protection/Eminent Domain Reform Legislation…Without Council or
Redevelopment Agency Board Public Discussion or Vote, LB REPORT.COM, Apr. 30, 2006,
http://www.lbreport.com/news/apr06/emdombi.htm (“The privately-run ‘League of CA Cities’
and the ‘CA Redevelopment Association’ operate in large part on public money sent to them as
dues, memberships and event registrations by government officials on the public payroll...who in
LB have (thus far) routinely expended the sums as ‘government-related.’”).
23
Id.
17
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be appropriate or necessary in the interest of the general welfare,
including recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant
to them and payments to school and community college districts . .
. .24
RDAs are subject to separate requirements regarding redevelopment of
undeveloped areas:25 to qualify for redevelopment, undeveloped areas must be
“stagnant or improperly utilized because of defective or inadequate street layout,
faulty lot layout in relation to size, shape, accessibility, or usefulness, or for other
causes,” or “[t]he areas require replanning and land assembly . . . in the interest of
the general welfare because of widely scattered ownership, tax delinquency, or
other reasons.”26 The language in these statutes is worded very favorably for
RDAs:

The requirement that government declare a neighborhood
“blighted” before condemning property might protect property
owners against government overreaching, if the definition of
“blight” were precise enough to prevent the government from
taking any but the most dangerous or extremely distressed
property. Unfortunately, many states, such as California, have
defined “blight” in terms so vague that officials are free to declare
virtually any property “blighted.”27

24

Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33020 (West 2006).
It is worth noting that, as a matter of textual purity, RDAs would have no authority
over undeveloped areas. As a matter of fundamental purpose for the establishment of RDAs, there
are few parallels for the need for governmental interference in developed versus undeveloped
areas. Removal of blight and other impediments to the free market are drastically less severe in
undeveloped areas.
26
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33021(c) (West 2006).
27
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 717.
The theory of economic development condemnations begins with the
concept of “blight.” Originally a term for a plant disease, the term “blight” was
first applied to neighborhoods during the Progressive era, by urban planners who
conceived of cities as similar to living organisms: when a neighborhood failed to
perform up to the standard required by the “needs of the public,” it was up to the
government to intercede and alter the economic situation so as to improve the
neighborhood.
25
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“Inadequate” street layout may be a point of legitimate debate: a challenger may
provide data, statistics, information about the general area, and other professional
opinions to rebut the RDA’s claim of inadequacy. “Defective” is much less
tangible, however, and an RDA may assert its own standard of what “defective”
is, making the claim unassailable. “Widely scattered ownership” is ominous
language for any homeowner who apparently could not possibly have any counter
argument unless he set to the task for buying up his neighbors’ homes as well.28
But even then, the RDA apparently is invited to offer any “other causes”29 to
validate their actions.
The RDA is granted the power of eminent domain to redevelop an
established project area.30 The Code describes the proper use of eminent domain:
[W]henever the redevelopment of blighted areas cannot be
accomplished by private enterprise alone, without public
participation and assistance in the acquisition of land . . . it is in the
public interest to employ the power of eminent domain . . . to
provide a means by which blighted areas may be redeveloped or
rehabilitated.31

Today, this attitude remains the keystone of economic development
projects.
Id. at 716.
28
See Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000)
(“The mere fact of multiple ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a condominium
development by definition would be blighted.”).
29
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33021(c)(2) (West 2006).
30
Id. § 33391 (“Within the survey area or for purposes of redevelopment an agency may .
. . [a]cquire real property by eminent domain.”). The power of eminent domain is granted by the
California Constitution. Cal. Const. art. I, § 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for
public use only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid
to, or into court for, the owner.”). The U.S. Constitution authorizes eminent domain at U.S. Const.
amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
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Thus an RDA may only use eminent domain when the requisite findings of blight
make such use necessary. However, the Code provides that it is the RDA, not the
judiciary, that is to determine when it is “necessary” to use eminent domain.32
B. Elimination of Market Impediments
The blight problem as stated in section 33036 is relatively uncontroversial:
“[C]onditions of blight tend to further obsolescence, deterioration, and disuse
because of the lack of incentive to the individual landowner and his inability to
improve, modernize, or rehabilitate his property while the condition of the
neighboring properties remains unchanged.”33 Alternatively stated, blight is a
difficult challenge to the free market. The Code goes further, stating that blight
“constitutes a serious and growing menace which is . . . injurious and inimical to
the public health, safety, and welfare.”34

Blight “present[s] difficulties and

handicaps which are beyond remedy and control solely by regulatory
processes.”35 Blight contributes to crime, juvenile delinquency, and increased

31

Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33037 (West 2006) (emphasis added).
Id. (“[T]he necessity in the public interest for the provisions of this part is declared to
be a matter of legislative determination.”) (emphasis added); see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §
1240.010 (West 2006).
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property
only for a public use. Where the Legislature provides by statute that a use,
pur pose, object, or function is one for which the power of eminent domain may
be exercised, such action is deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature that
such use, purpose, object, or function is a public use.
Id.
33
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33036(a) (West 2006).
34
Id. § 33035(a).
35
Id. § 33035(b).
32
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expenditures for police, fire, and other public services.36 The “benefits which will
result from the remedying of . . . blighted areas will accrue to all inhabitants and
property owners of the communities in which they exist.”37
The Code then begins to get more controversial, stating that, because of
blight, “the process of deterioration . . . frequently cannot be halted or corrected
except by redeveloping the entire area, or substantial portions of it.”38
“[R]emedying [blighted areas] may require the public acquisition . . . and the
redevelopment of [those] areas.”39

This declaration is rephrased at section

33030(a): “It is found and declared that there exist in many communities blighted
areas which constitute physical and economic liabilities, requiring redevelopment
in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of the people of these
communities and of the state.”40 As a technical matter, of course, this statement is
at the very best unverifiable; while the market may have certain observable
tendencies towards blighted areas, it could not be said in any given case that the
market could not correct the problem without RDA assistance. The market may
take longer to address the blight than the RDA is willing to wait, but it is quite
possible and even likely that the market would eventually be sufficiently
incentivized to develop the area on its own. The issue is simply a matter of

36

Id. § 33035(c).
Id. § 33035(e).
38
Id. § 33036(b).
39
Id. § 33036(d).
40
Id. § 33030(a) (emphasis added).
37
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patience and of faith that our free market system is, in fact, the best among the
alternatives.
The Code adds that “conditions of blight are chiefly found in areas
subdivided into small parcels, held in divided and widely scattered ownerships.”41
It becomes clear that the drafters of the CRL misunderstood symptoms for causes,
and thus misguidedly developed the CRL to eliminate the symptoms of blight, but
made no provisions for the actual causes. If causes are to be eliminated in such a
way, it would be purely coincidental. The CRL formally lists the causes of blight
in section 33039: “[T]he principal causes of slum and blighted residential areas
are . . . [i]nadequate enforcement of health, building, and safety laws. . . . limited
financial resources [of inhabitants] . . . . [r]acial discrimination . . . . [and the]
neglect of absentee landlords.”42 Except for removing neglectful landlords, it is
unclear how redevelopment purports to address any of these causes.
Finally, to obtain approval for an RDA project, the agency must provide a
report to the city council that, among other things, describes the project, describes
the blight, explains how the project will further the RDA’s goals, explains why
the free market alone could not overcome the blight, describes the method of
financing, and describes how families will be relocated.43 Although this seems to

41

Id. § 33036(c) (emphasis added).
Id. § 33039.
43
Id. § 33352.
42
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provide a substantial burden to the RDA, in practice these reports are typified by
conclusory statements and boilerplate language.
1. The Blight Standard
“Fully 25% of all urbanized land in California has now been declared
blighted,”44 and under California law, blight designations can remain on the books
indefinitely.45
Section 33030 explains what an RDA must provide to satisfy a finding of
blight under the California standard. The blight must create such a “serious
physical and economic burden” that it could not “reasonably be expected to be
reversed or alleviated by private enterprise or governmental action, or both,
without redevelopment.”46 Thus the effect of the blight must be so serious that
there could be no reasonable expectation of any other solution, be it private,
government, or some hybrid. In addition, the RDA must make a specific showing
of both the physical and economic elements of blight under section 33031(a) and
(b), respectively.47 Under section 33031(a), the RDA may prove the existence of
physical blight by showing serious building code violations, unsafe or unhealthy
buildings, factors hindering economically viable use, adjacent incompatible uses,
inadequate utilities, inadequate and irregular lot sizes in multiple ownership,

44

MORR Report, supra note 1, at 4.
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 717.
46
Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33030(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
47
Id. § 33030(b)(2).
45
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insufficient parking, or “other similar factors.”48 Under section 33031(b), the
RDA may prove the existence of economic blight by showing static property
values, high crime, relatively low lease rates or high business vacancies, or too
many vacant lots, bars, liquor stores, or people.49 That California’s blight statutes
are relatively strict is not comforting. It is still open to abuse, and rent-seekers
know it. Section 33031(a)(2) and (3) “have been the subject of more frequent
redevelopment misuses than any other part of the CRL. Focusing on greater
precision in statutory definition than currently exists in these subsections of the
blight statutes would have a far more meaningful effect on the perceived misuses
of redevelopment.” 50

III. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE USE OF GOVERNMENT COERCION IN
OVERCOMING MARKET IMPEDIMENTS
“In 1945, California was the first state to adopt a Community
Redevelopment Act that gave cities and counties the ability to establish
redevelopment agencies.”51 The vast power of government in its police powers
governing land use has arguably been put to good use in overcoming classic
market problems such as holdouts, free-riders, collective action, and oligopolies.
In Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court held that breaking up a land oligopoly was a

48

Id. § 33031(a).
Id. § 33031(b).
50
Tepper, supra note 11, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
51
JEFF CHAPMAN, Tax Increment Financing and Fiscal Stress: The California Genesis, in
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 114.
49
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permissible exercise of the state’s eminent domain authority.52 Because the land
was not likely to be made available for purchase by the general public by any
reasonable efforts of the free market system, eminent domain is properly
exercised to maintain a free property system. Midkiff is an example of the use of
eminent domain for the (at least ostensible) purpose of facilitating the free market
system. Because the Hawaii state authority did not have any further plans to put
the property into the hands of other private individuals in particular (it was to be
made available for purchase to the current tenants of the land), the exercise was
reactive rather than proactive. That is, the remedy restored the fate of the land to
the free market. 53
Berman illustrates the next major step by state authorities to use the power
of eminent domain in a more proactive way. In Berman, Washington D.C. slums
were labeled as physically and economically blighted, taken via eminent domain,
and cleared and redeveloped by a private developer. The Berman court held that
blight-removal is a legitimate public use for which the power of eminent domain
may be exercised.54 Berman can be seen as a logical step after Midkiff: if blight
may be construed as an insurmountable market obstacle, akin to monopolies and
oligopolies, the coercive power of eminent domain may be justified. The holding

52

Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 230 (1984).
“[I]ronically,” however, “the effect of the law was perverse. Instead of lowering, or at
least maintaining home prices, it accomplished the opposite. It fueled a wholesale transfer of
desirable homes to Japanese investors and provided huge economic incentives for the former land
lessees to sell their homes and become instant millionaires.” Gideon Kanner, The Public Use
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 356 (2006).
54
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
53
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guaranteed that blight-removal was a permissible purpose, something that city
planners had banked on since the first federal urban redevelopment laws in the
1960s.55 Berman, of course, deferred to the legislative determination over the
severity of blight and whether it is truly a market obstacle, as does California’s
redevelopment law. What is more, Berman permitted the state agency to take
parcels that did not meet the blight standard, but that were deemed “necessary” to
fulfill the overall blight-removal project.56 This detail has been a source of alarm
for many redevelopment critics. This rule leaves open the question of how far the
RDA should be permitted to go in determining which parcels are “necessary.” If
a state’s blight standard is already malleable, and if a court is to permit broad
discretion in the municipality’s exercise of eminent domain to achieve
redevelopment objectives in blight-removal, is allowing an RDA an additional
indeterminate buffer sound policy?

Is it really even necessary?

Providing

limitations to RDAs that are malleable and adjudicative at every step of the

55

See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California Redevelopment Law,
42 HASTINGS L. J. 991, 992 (2001).
Proponents of the first federal urban redevelopment law were
concerned that federal courts might declare redevelopment unconstitutional . . . .
Blight removal brought redevelopment well within the ambit of “health and
safety” since policy makers at that time were convinced that overcrowding in
low income areas contributed to the spread of disease and crime.
Id.
56
Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on
the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public
interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly. . . .
[C]ommunity redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be
on a piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.
Id.
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redevelopment process makes it difficult for courts to impose meaningful checks
on their authority without being criticized as being judicial activists.
Redevelopment law thus provides precious few opportunities for judicial checks.
Berman’s treatment of legislative determinations of the nature and severity
of blight may have been suspect, but the Michigan Supreme Court’s treatment in
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit57 was blatantly pretextual.

The

circumstances surrounding Poletown were heart-wrenching: 4,200 people lost
their homes, businesses, and churches for corporate welfare in its purest form. In
Berman, the U.S. Supreme Court had looked to aspects of both economic58 and
physical59 blight, and determined that, where both of these elements exist, there is
a plausible argument that the project area is beyond reasonable market correction.
Poletown removed the physical blight requirement from the Michigan standard,
allowing the full measure of eminent domain power to achieve purely economic
purposes.60 The U.S. Supreme Court implicitly validated the Poletown decision
in Kelo, a case with analogous facts. The city of Detroit sought to supplant an
entire residential neighborhood to make way for General Motors’ new Cadillac
plant; the City of New London, Connecticut, sought to accommodate
pharmaceutical giant Pfizer in a quaint downtown waterfront residential

57

410 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 n.1 (“‘Substandard housing conditions’ means . . . the
existence of . . . lack of sanitary facilities, ventilation, or light, or . . . dilapidation, overcrowding,
faulty interior arrangement . . . .”).
59
Id.
60
Poletown, 410 N.W.2d at 459.
58
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The Court held that potential future revenues deriving from

Pfizer’s profitable use of the land was a public purpose, satisfying the Fifth
Amendment.61 “The rationale of such cases is that some of the private economic
benefits expected to be reaped by the redeveloper will trickle down . . . and will
thus constitute a ‘public benefit’ which the Court equated with . . . ‘public use.’”62
Or in other words, “yuppification is a valid public purpose.”63
Thus in our case law respecting government powers in removing market
obstacles, “we moved from ‘slum clearance’ to ‘urban renewal’ to ‘removing
blight’ to ‘economic redevelopment.’”64
A. Redevelopment Under the Hathcock65 Standard
Some years after the Poletown decision, the Michigan Supreme Court
thought better of its takings jurisprudence, and instituted a new standard in its
decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.66 The Hathcock decision borrowed
extensively from Justice Ryan’s dissenting opinion in Poletown,67 and set forth a
new three-part disjunctive test to determine when an exercise of the eminent
domain authority would bepermitted .

61

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (2005) (“Clearly, there is no
basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose.”).
62
Kanner, supra note 53, at 336.
63
Id.
64
Theodore C. Taub, The Changing Landscape of Condemnation and Redevelopment
698 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Aug. 2005), available at SL005 ALI-ABA 693 (Westlaw).
65
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
66
Id.
67
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
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1. “Public Necessity of the Extreme Sort”68
The taking is for a public use if it is towards achieving a public necessity
of the extreme sort. This test requires that the project not only be advantageous to
the community, but that there be some dire or exigent need for it.

The

condemning authority must demonstrate that the forced transfer “to a private
entity involved ‘public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise impracticable.’”69
The necessity required by the Michigan Supreme Court is an actual, physical
necessity; the “very existence [of the public benefits] depends on the use of
land.”70 The kind of necessity intimated here includes the traditional examples of
market failure: holdouts,71 free-riders, collective action, monopolies, and
oligopolies. This was the sort of necessity that arose in Midkiff, as well as in other
cases in legal history such as the building of “highways, railroads, [and] canals.”72
It is this kind of necessity that would serve well in California, as it would force
RDAs to act as a facilitator or mediator between private enterprise and market
obstacles such as blight and holdouts, rather than as a market actor itself, with its
own tax and revenue agendas. Moreover, it would take the power of eminent
domain from the pockets of prospective rent-seekers, since they would not be able

68

Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455, 478 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See Tepper, supra note 11
, at 38 (“Eminent domain is particularly useful in
redevelopment settings to acquire property from these ‘holdout’ property owners—that is, the
owners who sell last in order to extract the highest prices.”).
72
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005) (quoting Poletown, 410
N.W.2d 455, 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
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to blackmail sales-tax-revenue-desperate cities unless they could show honest-togoodness blight. While an RDA is certainly an administrative overhead whose
costs are critically important to a bottom-line perspective, the objective of
improving local revenues must be indirect, not direct. When a government makes
generating revenues its primary goal, it tends to abuse the terrific powers at its
disposal to reach those goals by a shorter cut than our free-market system is
capable of.
2. “Independent Public Significance”73
Eminent domain could be exercised under the Hathcock standard if the
property itself has been “selected on the basis of ‘facts of independent public
significance.’”74 In other words, it does not avail the RDA under this test to argue
that, by bringing GM or Pfizer or any other private developer in to redevelop the
land, new sales taxes will revitalize the city to a bustling utopia. Instead, the
agency must show that, whatever their ultimate plans for the land, the land is
currently languishing in such a state of blight that its mere removal is required in

73

Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting)).
74
Id.; see also Redevelopment Agency of San Francisco v. Hayes, 266 P.2d 105, 114,
123 (Cal. 1954), cert. denied.
Originally the definition of “public use” was very narrowly restricted. . . . [T]he
more modern courts have enlarged the traditional definition of public use to
include “public purpose.” The idea now is that the taking of the property itself,
as distinguished from the subsequent use of that property, may be required in the
public interest.
....
. . . [Since] the acquiring of the property is for a public use, its sale and the
transfer of the property from one individual to another, so far as they may occur,
are merely incidental to that use . . . .
Id.
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This test implicitly assuages Justice

O’Connor’s fears put forth in her Kelo dissent: since any property may be put to a
higher and better use by some deep-pocketed developer, the “specter of
condemnation hangs over all property.”75 But under this prong of the Hathcock
test, the RDA would not be able to mount its public use claim from the empty
guarantee of incidental sales tax revenues springing from the new Wal-Mart, auto
dealership, business park, or GM plant.

Instead, government agencies are

relegated to removing externalities that would inhibit such private uses. With the
development landscape groomed this way, that is, without any additional
pandering and influence from the redevelopment agencies, private enterprise
would take its natural course in siting beneficial uses within the community. This
view has much deeper roots in Michigan case law, going back to an 1852 decision
in Swan v. Williams.76 The Michigan Supreme Court in Swan noted the proper
place for government in our system of free enterprise:
To say, as has been too often carelessly said, that “the acts done by
these corporations are done with a view to their own interests, from
which an incidental benefit springs to the public,” is to admit their
private character, and the private use of the property condemned to

75

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005); see also Lawrence Berger, The
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 237 (1978) (arguing that
monopoly and efficiency are not sufficient to justify a taking without an impending public need);
see also Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 28
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 678 (2005) [hereinafter Sandefur: A Gleeful Obituary]
(“Americans in most states are at risk of losing their homes to whatever faction is able to gain
political influence.”); Gary P. Johnson, The Effect of the Public Use Requirement on Excess
Condemnation, 48 TENN. L. REV. 370, 373-74 (1981) (“Consequently, courts began to look at the
ultimate purpose of a project in order to justify a taking that eventually would benefit the public.”).
76

2 Mich. 427 (1852).
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their use. But it is obvious, that the object which determines the
character of a corporation is that designed by the legislature, rather
than that sought by the company. If that object be primarily the
private interest of its members, although an incidental benefit may
accrue to the government therefrom, then the corporation is
private, but if that object be the public interest, to be secured by the
exercise of powers, delegated for that purpose, which would
otherwise repose in the State, then, although private interest may
be incidentally promoted, the corporation is in its nature public—it
is essentially the trustee of the government for the promotion of the
objects desired—a mere agent, to which authority is delegated to
work out the public interest through the means provided by
government for that purpose, and broadly distinguishable from one
created for the attainment of no public end, and from which no
benefit accrues to the community except such as results
incidentally, and not necessarily, from its operations.77
This is an astute observation, and one that has been largely ignored in more
modern case law. The issue, simply stated, is that where private actors create a
public benefit, this benefit is incidental, and cannot therefore be the purpose of
state action. Instead, if a local government wishes to cite this benefit as a “public
use” in order to exercise eminent domain authority, the private actor must become
an agent of the public. To strike a sort of middle ground, as is the modern state of
affairs, is to establish a kind of unholy union between government and free
enterprise, a system in which certain individuals are able to gain access to the
sovereign governmental powers without the attendant governmental legal and
political restrictions. This is the source of frustration of propertarians, but more
importantly, it encapsulates in heady legal prose what is so visceral and obvious
about the debate. To take someone’s land to give to another is just plain irksome.

77

Swan, 2 Mich. at 435.
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And at some point, it’s going to drive people crazy,78 or break their spirits.79 The
Swan treatment warrants review in the wake of our current upheaval of eminent
domain law post-Kelo.
3. “Accountab[ility] to the Public”80
The third test under the Hathcock standard prohibits exercise of eminent
domain authority “unless, after it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the
public, independent of the will of the corporation taking it.’”81 This test suggests
a return to the Swan rationale, leaving behind fanciful constructions of private
development as being effected for public use.

To meet the standard for

employing the drastic measure of eminent domain, the project must truly be in the
hands of the public. Under this standard, regulation82 and subsidies83 would
remain a public use, but clearing entire neighborhoods and assembling city blocks
to make way for a new Costco would not.

78

Governments would be able to

See infra, note 107, at 31( describing a condemnee who shot and killed two sheriff’s
deputies in South Carolina).
79
See infra, Part IV.
80
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 782.
81
Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, 476 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Berrien
Springs Water Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 94 N.W. 379, 380-81 (Mich. 1903))).
82
See Sandefur: A Gleeful Obituary, supra note 75, at 656 (“One chief rationalization
[for finding a public use] was that the railroad was regulated by the government in such a way as
to render it essentially ‘public.’”).
83
See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 653, 727
(2005) [hereinafter Kanner:,Making Laws and Sausages] (remarking that subsidies were given to
railroads because of the substantial reciprocal benefits given to society, and because of the great
risk taken by the railroads, intimating that the government wished to make up the cost of risk by
granting subsidies.) However, subsidies are often also granted towards wasteful projects to reward
political supporters. Id. at 762-63. See also Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. Los
Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Cal. 1979) (“[A]irports so subsidized must be available for public
use on ‘fair and reasonable terms and without unjust discrimination, . . .’”).
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subsidize utilities that would pay enormous dividends to constituents, but may be
too risky for private investors, or would not pay out sufficient dividends.84
Requiring the government to retain control over the project ensures accountability
and the continued public usefulness of the project, rather than a mere hand-off to
private investment.85
B. Tax Increment Financing Improperly Incentivizes RDAs
The financing structure behind California RDAs is out of alignment with
the purpose of removing true blight.

As such, it creates an inefficient and

impossibly conflicted regime in which RDAs seek out pseudo-blighted properties,
when what they really want is to capture increment property values.

Tax

increment financing (TIF) is one of the most widely used methods of generating
the funds necessary to finance community redevelopment projects.86

TIF is

permitted under the California Constitution,87 and is articulated by the California
Supreme Court thusly:

84

See Kanner: Making Laws and Sausages, supra note 83, at 727 (discussing the
importance of the role of railroads, which is why they were subsidized).
85
A hand-off not only removes the project from oversight by the political process, it also
removes the project from the stricter legal accountability that applies to government employers.
86
JOYCE Y. MAN, Introduction, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 1; George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right for California
Redevelopment Law, 42 HASTINGS L. J. 991, 996 (2001).
87
Cal. Const. art. XVI, § 16. That formula is as follows:
(a) That portion of the taxes which would be produced by the rate upon which
the tax is levied each year by . . . [the] taxing agencies upon the total sum of the
assessed value of the taxable property in the redevelopment project as shown
upon the assessment roll used in connection with the taxation of such property
by such taxing agenc[ies], last equalized prior to the effective date of such
ordinance [adopting the redevelopment plan], shall be allocated to . . . the funds
of the respective taxing agencies . . .; and (P)(b) That portion of said levied taxes
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In essence this section provides that if, after a
redevelopment project has been approved, the assessed valuation
of taxable property in the project increases, the taxes levied on
such property in the project area are divided between the taxing
agency and the redevelopment agency. The taxing agency receives
the same amount of money it would have realized under the
assessed valuation existing at the time the project was approved,
while the additional money resulting from the rise in assessed
valuation is placed in a special fund for repayment of indebtedness
incurred in financing the project.88
TIF experienced enormous popularity in California after the adoption of
Proposition 13, which strictly limited increases in property taxes.89 California
was the first state to adopt TIF,90 and its TIF laws are amazingly detailed and
complex, totaling over three hundred printed pages.91
The allure of TIFs, of course, is that it provides a way that RDAs may, in
theory, pay for their projects without putting additional burden on the general tax

each year in excess of such amount shall be allocated to . . . a special fund of the
redevelopment agency . . . .
Id.
88

Redevelopment Agency v. County of San Bernardino, 21 Cal. 3d 255, 259 (1978); see
also County of Santa Clara v. Redevelopment Agency, 18 Cal. App. 4th 1008, 1011 (1993):
Increment revenue, which is the primary source of funding for
redevelopment projects, consists of the increased property tax revenue resulting
from rises in the assessed valuation of property in a redevelopment project area.
Taxing agencies continue to receive the amount of revenue they would have
received under the assessed valuation existing at the time the project was
approved, while the additional revenue attributable to the project is placed in a
special fund of the redevelopment agency for repayment of indebtedness
incurred in financing the project.
Id.
89
Man, supra note 86, at 17.
90
Id.
91
CRAIG L. JOHNSON & KENNETH A. KRIZ, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing
Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 32.
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base.92 And naturally, the TIF system is not without its criticisms.93 But in the
context of our discussion of structural defects in the California redevelopment
regime, perhaps the most compelling criticism is that it improperly incentivizes
RDAs to plan project areas where private enterprise is already likely to invest.94

92

But see JOYCE Y. MAN, Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic
Development, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at
105 (“Given the conflicting views with respect to the effectiveness of TIF, more research needs to
be done before we can reach a consensus, if any, on the issue of whether TIF programs have
achieved their goals of stimulating economic development.”). And yet despite the uncertain
efficacy of TIF, California has wagered $61 billion in RDA debt, largely funded through TIF, in
hopes that TIF will pay out. See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 11.
93
These criticisms include: (1) TIFs provide an inefficient incentive system; (2) TIFs
represent a zero-sum game that simply rearranges wealth, but does not actually generate new
revenues; (3) TIF systems allow municipalities to capture the revenue from other municipalities,
most notably from school districts; (4) TIF systems are complex and administratively costly; (5)
TIF systems provide little or no voter participation, and as such are an improper delegation of
legislative power; (6) TIF systems provide an incentive for RDAs to initiate projects irrespective
of the likelihood that development would be initiated by private enterprise. Man, supra note 86, at
4-7.
94
Man explains further:
Although local governments claim to adopt the TIF program as an incentive to
induce development in an area that would have otherwise not occurred, in some
cases it could be argued that such development would have occurred without the
incentive provided through TIF. There are also charges that local incentives
under TIF mislead some firms to an inappropriate location and that government
subsidies are provided to firms or affluent areas that do not need them, thus
wasting taxpayers’ money.
Id. at 6.
TIF is a popular tool when redevelopment is truly necessary and TIF is
used in an appropriate manner. However, in some cases when TIF is misused,
school and other affected jurisdictions often object to TIF on the grounds that
they lose tax revenues from investments in the area unrelated to the TIF district
and fear increased demand on their services without compensation.
JOYCE Y. MAN, Determinants of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Increment Financing, TAX
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 51, at 91, n.3; see also CRAIG
L. JOHNSON, Conclusion, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note
51, at 258, discussing sales tax increment finance programs (STIFs) (“The most attractive areas for
generating [] tax increment flows are not blighted urban areas, but rather undeveloped tracts or
areas with the potential for manufacturing or wholesaling development that will add to the
regional export base.”). Johnson also urges for careful oversight of RDAs’ use of TIF:
TIF projects must be carefully planned, continually monitored, diligently
implemented, critically evaluated, and ultimately terminated. The laws of a state
that govern the TIF process must be structured to channel the political process
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The ideal site for the production of a big tax increment is
either vacant when declared a redevelopment project area or easily
cleared. It must also be a site upon which private redevelopers are
ready to build immediately. This usually precludes redevelopment
of the most crime-ridden and poverty-stricken sites in town
because there is simply no alternate market for them.
....
The realities of TIF contradict the premise . . . that
redevelopment powers should be reserved exclusively for projects
which private developers wouldn't have built on their own.95
Blight removal is, at bottom, only an indirect boon to revenue stimulation.
CRL is carefully designed to ensure that future revenues are not a direct or
principal motivator of RDAs in their duty of removing community blight.96 TIFs

and financial subsidies in ways that further the public interest. A finding of
blight in a TID [tax increment district] creates the link between the activities of
private developers and the public purpose necessary for government to exercise
the powers of eminent domain and support a project using tax dollars. In
addition, if the development would have occurred without the expenditure of
public TIF funds (i.e., the “but for” test was not passed), then a larger public
purpose has not been served, and development should be left to the private
sector. . . . [A] blighted finding and but for test . . . are fundamentally sound
“first” principles and do provide the underpinning justification for TIF . . . .
Id. at 258-59.
95
Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 1003-05 (emphasis added). Lefcoe explains further:
This premise is beside the point to redevelopment officials single-mindedly
following the money. For this reason, a much favored strategy is to include
within newly established redevelopment project area boundaries major private
projects already scheduled for construction. Though patently illegal because
these projects would have been built even in the absence of redevelopment, the
ensuing tax increment jump-starts the rest of the redevelopment effort.
Id. at 1005.
96
Jeff Chapman explains:
TIF redevelopment must be carefully monitored by public-sector
decision makers. There is a good deal of money involved in the process, and
there are often conflicting pressures on the RDA. These pressures come from
the jurisdiction that initiated the redevelopment agency, developers, advocates
for low-income residents, citizens, and overlapping jurisdictions. Gradually, the
California law has been tightened to ensure that redevelopment activity is in
response to blight, not in response to fiscal stress or arcane state revenue
distribution formulas.
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create a counter-productive incentive system, as George Lefcoe points out, and it
is no wonder that RDAs are falling over themselves to find “blight” in their
neighborhoods so that they can sell more bonds against tax increments. If a
project is inefficiently planned in an area that would have been developed just as
well in the private sector without the RDA, the effect is that the taxpayer winds up
footing the costs of the development instead of the private developer.97 This will
likely have a direct impact on the school district that is now frozen out of its share
of the tax increment,98 enrich bond brokers and investors, inspire TIF-funded
municipal bidding wars,99 and keep the RDA in business.100 Thus while TIF is

. . . . If [blight statutes] are accurately followed, the use of TIF to avoid
fiscal stress would be more difficult.
Chapman, supra note 51, at 129. Chapman explains additional legislative changes considered by
the California legislature, including a requirement that RDAs show a link between expenditures
and blight removal, and a prohibition on projects that benefited automobile dealerships and other
big box retailers. “In the year in which the law was completing the legislative process . . .
redevelopment agencies placed about three times more land into project areas than they had in the
year before.” Id. at 129-30.
97
Id. at 131.
If development is occurring in a particular area, or if that area is
situated in a location in which development is highly likely to occur in the future
. . . then a property tax increment will be generated. If a redevelopment agency
decides to consider this area as blighted, it will unjustly appropriate the
increment, the overlapping jurisdictions will not receive their fair share, and it is
likely that the redevelopment project is being formed for reasons other than
Id.
blight.
98
“The efficiency justification for TIF is weakened when the project would have been
built anyway somewhere within the boundaries of the school district or county. Redevelopment
proponents admit this possibility but contend that without their efforts poor areas would continue
deteriorating while rich areas prosper.” Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 997.
99
“Taxpayers are understandably chagrined when municipalities try to lure private
developers away from each other with tax dollars. The temptation is always present and often
proves irresistible when most of the funding comes from taxing entities other than the one
extending the subsidy.” Id. at 1007.
100
“To succeed in California, a redevelopment agency depends on there being new
construction or a change in ownership within project area boundaries since California's property
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attractive in theory, its abuse is just too great a temptation for California’s
misconceived and misdirected RDAs.
Jeff Chapman encapsulates the incentive problem in California
redevelopment law with respect to TIF:
Over the past fifteen years, California has enacted a complex series
of laws that have attempted to ensure that TIF development is used
appropriately.
This illustrates that continual monitoring is
necessary in order to convince the agencies, developers, and public
that TIF is being used to eliminate blight—the purpose for which it
was justified. But even under these continuing legal constraints,
redevelopment agencies are likely to continue to search for exceptions . . . .
TIF can be a useful tool. Projects can generate revenue
streams that can be turned into a self-financing instrument. But it
only works correctly if it is carefully planned, monitored, and
implemented under the light of public scrutiny.101

IV. POWER AND PRAGMATISM
A. The People Will Not Receive Current Redevelopment Law
When Solon, the great Athenian lawmaker, was asked whether he had
given to the Athenians the best laws he could devise, he replied that he had given
them instead “the best they w[ou]ld receive.’”102 Solon recognized that laws must
not only be just, but they must be agreeable to those they mean to govern. The

tax regime allows for assessments to current market value only upon a change in ownership or
new construction.” Id. at 1003.
101
See Chapman, supra note 51, at 132.
102
James Madison, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 317 (Ohio Univ.
Press, 1966) (July 18, 1787). Solon wrote the Solonian Constitution, incorporating the first
elements of a civil democracy. His laws were a compromise between oligarchy and democracy,
appeasing both the aristocrats and the ordinary people.
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Kelo decision dismayed the entire nation, transcending party and class
designations, and regardless of the lawfulness of the decision, the people have not
received it. People are angry at the decision, and unwilling to accept that their
local government officials have the right to take their homes to boost tax
revenues.

“The Court's stature plummeted when it endorsed taking private

property for private use.”103 In the wake of Kelo, Professor Thomas Merrill was
surprised by the public outcry. “Merrill finally decided that ‘the nub of the
problem is that the American people believe that property rights are invested with
moral significance.’”104
The policy towards defending individual rights is not a groundless one,
nor is it merely normative. It is rooted in notions of pragmatism, the notion that
the right action is not always the one that looks best on paper. It is the notion that
embraces the plain fact that humans are not rational economic actors, and that
even if we were, we cannot possibly understand or accurately assess all of the
values at stake in social choices. Pragmatism is the practical companion to
utilitarianism.

Although utilitarianism seeks the greatest good, it is often

conflated with applied economics, and sets to the task of gathering and calculating
values to determine the best outcome.

103

While such an approach is a useful

Douglas W. Kmiec, Abandoning Common Sense, CAL. LAW., Sep. 2005, at 21, 21.
Polls have described the backlash: 89% of people are opposed to takings for economic
development. Michael Corkery & Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain Uproar Imperils Projects,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at B1. Another poll increased the number to 93%. Matt Welch, The
Left's Eyeing Your Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at M6.
104
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 706.
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academic exercise, and would ostensibly endorse such redevelopment decisions as
those in Poletown and Kelo, it fails to take into account certain unshakable
principles to which human beings cling, namely that we should be free in our
property.105 To claim that such tenacity is irrational is of no use. Irrational it is,
and so we must account for it. To do otherwise would be to act irrationally
ourselves. And as aristocratic policy makers, we cannot afford such a folly.
Thankfully, we can deal with irrationality. It is unpredictability that would prove
troublesome. If people’s reactions towards violations of these principles were
unpredictable, we may not be able to account for them in any meaningful way.
But they are not. People may be irrational, but taken en masse they are quite
predictable.
So what is this “irrational” sentiment to which we humans, particularly we
Americans, cling? The overwhelming feeling is that “[n]o Americans, no matter
how poor and powerless, should be forcibly thrown out of their own homes and
undercompensated in the process; certainly not because another private party
wants to make money from their land without observing the basic societal nicety
of buying it in a voluntary transaction.”106 “There are a lot of citizens who are
offended by the widespread employment of this power—and not all of them are

105

People v. Lacey, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 2004) (unpublished disposition),
available at 2004 WL 1040676. Although this language refers to privacy, it accurately captures
the attitude that average landowners have towards their property.
106
Kanner, supra note 53, at 381 (emphasis added).
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completely rational about it.”107 “Regardless of the amount paid, many people are
offended that they can be forced by their government to yield their property so
that somebody else can profit from it.”108
For many, the jig is up, and citizens are becoming aware that “government
agencies [are] try[ing] to balance their budgets on the backs of faultless property
owners who are simply unlucky enough to own the wrong land at the wrong
time.”109 An upset Poletown resident objected to Detroit’s plan thusly: “Even in
communist Poland we can find no record of churches being torn down along with,
or without, their neighborhood homes to establish an industrial facility.”

110

George Lefcoe remarks that “[t]axpayers are understandably chagrined when
municipalities try to lure private developers away from each other with tax
dollars.”111
B. Fixing the Problem
So what is needed? Propertarians are angry, to be sure, but do they offer
anything helpful in the stead of the current regime? Although the idea of eminent
domain sours the stomach, it is arguably quite necessary in the concept of an

107

Michael M. Berger, Update on the Right to Take 13 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan.
2005) available at SK045 ALI-ABA 1. Berger goes on to describe a South Carolina man who
shot and killed two sheriff’s deputies as the State Department of Transportation came to take his
land to widen a highway. Afterwards, the man remarked “‘If we can’t be any freer than that in
this country, I’d rather die.’” This type of event, though not likely to become very common,
should at least serve as a “warning to government agencies that there may be something amiss in
their acquisition procedures.” Id.
108
Id. at 15.
109
Id. at 14.
110
POLETOWN LIVES! (Information Factory 1983).
111
Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 1007.
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ordered liberty protected by a sovereign government. “Government agencies at
all levels have become blasé about their use of the power of eminent domain . . .
.”112 “Should the process of public land acquisition grind to a halt? Nothing so
drastic is needed. Perhaps, however, governments at all levels could use a bit of
what the touchy-feely folks call sensitivity training.”113 However, the solution
will be ne ither easily implemented nor easily known. “Eminent domain abuse is a
symptom of a profound cultural and philosophical breakdown, meaning that really
fixing the problem posed by Kelo will take much more than political action.”114
On the other side of the debate, municipalities are perhaps just as attached
to their redevelopment powers as individuals are to the homes and businesses.
During the debate over Poletown, Detroit city council member Clyde Cleveland
complained that he was “sick and tired of one of the best things that has happened
to the city of Detroit, that people have used every obstruction and tactic they
could come up with in order to block it.”115 Similarly, Erma Henderson, another
Detroit city council member, said “I don’t know why they persist in doing
this.”116 The paradigm of local governments in providing services and competing
with neighboring cities and towns in the past 50 years has become more and more

112

Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 12.
82 Cal. App. 4th 511 (2000); see also STEVEN GREENHUT, ABUSE OF POWER: HOW
GOVERNMENT MISUSES EMINENT DOMAIN 144 (2005) (“This is how governments now routinely
operate, taking property from small owners and giving them to big ones, and treating the
victimized owners shabbily. It's no aberration.”).
113
Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 14.
114
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 707.
115
POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110.
116
Id.
112
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entangled with and dependent upon the notion of coercive bargaining and
redevelopment. Weaning them off of this dependency will not be easy. It is not
enough that an RDA make a “lawful”117 exercise of authority, nor is it enough
that the benefits of the project outweigh the immediate political costs. Just as the
private market often fails to accurately assess the externalities of its actions,
especially as to long-range externalities, politicians and RDAs fail to appreciate
the sociological externalities of their coercive methods in redevelopment.
The city of Detroit provides a good example of this in its exercise of
redevelopment and eminent domain authority to obliterate the community of
Poletown, replete with beautiful churches and vibrant businesses. As part of its
strategy to demoralize and dismantle the steadfastness of the community’s
holdouts, the city approached Cardinal John F. Dearden of the Archdiocese of
Detroit to acquire the community’s Catholic churches, the Immaculate
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It is of little comfort that redevelopment agencies be procedurally precise. Given the
difficulty and expense in surmounting blight findings, not to mention finding and availing oneself
of the narrow windows available for such objections, it is the rare challenger that is able to mount
a successful attack against a careful RDA staff that has been adequately prepared by city attorneys.
This is not to mention that one must learn to watch out for the wiles and pretext of the agency:
Officials are often required to draft a redevelopment plan before
proceeding; such a plan will include fact-finding by consultants, who are hired
to advise the city on whether a specified area is “blighted.” These consultants
are too often willing to tell cities whatever they want to hear; in one recent
California case, a trial court rejected the findings of a consultant that had
performed what it euphemistically called a “windshield survey” of a
neighborhood to determine whether it was blighted. A windshield survey, of
course, means that the consultant simply drove through the neighborhood before
writing up a report declaring the neighborhood blighted.
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 716-17.

Who Will Redevelop Redevelopment?

34

Conception and St. John the Evangelist.118 The backlash against the Archdiocese
was great. Reverend Joseph Karasiewicz of the Immaculate Conception Church,
was an important leader in the protest against both the Archdiocese’s decision and
the city’s scheme to demolish his parishioners’ homes, businesses, and churches.
Karasiewicz’s defiance of his Cardinal and Archdiocese is indicative of the
sociological impacts that coercive governmental dealings create. He denounced
the city’s actions, saying “this is an evil law, and we have to fight it.”119 For his
protesting Karasiewicz was kicked out of the rectory and never given another
permanent assignment.

Parishioner Ann Locklear remarked a year after her

evacuation that she had “lost my faith in the Church, the city and General
Motors.”120

“It's the principle of the thing,” said Poletown resident Kris

Biernacki.121 “I think the whole thing stinks. I just don't believe it happened. It's
breathtaking. We didn't have a voice in it—not a voice. We didn't want to move.
We were literally forced to move out. We were just told to go.”122
Eventually, of course, the last of the residents were eliminated, some
forcibly,123 and the neighborhood homes and churches were obliterated to make
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POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110; see also Jenny Nolan, Auto Plant vs.
Neighborhood: The Poletown Battle, THE DETROIT NEWS,
http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?id=18&category=business.
119
Jacob Sullum, Rediscovering Property Rights in the Rubble of Poletown, THE
ECOLOGIC POWERHOUSE (Oct. 2004), http://www.eco.freedom.org/articles/sullum-1004.shtml
(last visited Apr. 29, 2006).
120
Nolan, supra note 118.
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Sullum, supra note 119.
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Id.
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See POLETOWN LIVES!, supra note 110 (depicting the arrest of several elderly women
during the final protest of the taking and demolition of their neighborhood church).
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way for the sprawling green GM campus. Over time, the story of the Poletown
residents’ fight disappeared from the headlines. But the fight remains an integral
part of American legal history. The case appears in every property law textbook
as the archetypical illustration of the devastating power of redevelopment and the
consequences of a deferential blight standard.
C. Where’s the Blight? California Redevelopment Abuse
Preeminent redevelopment attorney Murray O. Kane exposed Diamond
Bar’s bogus blight determination in Diamond Bar. “The mere fact of multiple
ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a condominium development by
definition would be blighted.”124 Kane provided a videotaped 28 minute tour of
Dia mond Bar’s designated project area to illustrate in the plainest of terms the
senselessness of the City’s blight claims. As to this video, the appellate court
remarked: “[We] feel[] compelled to comment that [we] viewed the plaintiffs'
videotapes in their entirety and did not perceive anything remotely resembling
blight. The videotapes depicted modern, well-maintained, retail and office
structures, amidst ample landscaping and open space, in a partially rustic setting.”125The Kelo decision has kindled national recognition of eminent domain
abuse through redevelopment.

Kelo sends the message to homeowners and

business owners that no property is safe that attracts the attention of the local
RDA.

However, Californians are not up against the same unfettered
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Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000).
Id. at 394 n.4.
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governmental power that Kelo validated. At least, not in theory. California’s
blight standard was designed to provide additional checks against the kind of
seemingly arbitrary abuse that Kelo showed was otherwise permissible. But does
California’s CRL actually provide any meaningful check against the full brunt of
the federal Kelo rule for takings? Or does the California blight standard simply
mean more paperwork for the RDAs? California Health and Safety Code treats
redevelopment as a “last resort.”126 But do redevelopment agencies?
D. Treatment of Blight in California Case Law
Commentators have noted the relative severity of California blight laws.
“Nowhere have the statutory definitions of blight, and judicial enforcement of
those standards, been more restrictive than in California.”127 “In California, based
solely on the administrative record, courts will overturn a local government's
finding of blight, or a trial court's affirmation of such a finding, for want of
substantial evidence supporting the decision.”128 Compared to the treatment of
blight by other state courts,129 California shows markedly less deference to RDAs.
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Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 997; Cal. Health and Safety Code § 33030(b)(1) (West 2006)
(providing for redevelopment only when the extent of blight “constitutes a serious physical and
economic burden . . . which cannot reasonably be expected to be reversed or alleviated by private
enterprise or governmental action, or both, without redevelopment”).
127
Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 991.
128
Id. at 1010 (citing Fosselman's, Inc. v. City of Alhambra, 224 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363-64
(Ct. App. 1986)).
129
See id. (describing other state court tests, including overturning when the
determination was arbitrary and capricious and without any evidentiary support (Miller v. City of
Tacoma, 378 P.2d 464, 474–75 (Wash. 1963)), only for findings arising from “fraud, bad faith,
[or] abuse of discretion” (Urban Renewal Agency v. Decker, 415 P.2d 373, 377 (Kan. 1966)), or
almost complete preclusion of challenges to RDA resolutions (Allen v. City Council, 113 S.E.2d
621, 623-24 (Ga. 1960))).
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“City renewal directors quickly learned there was no realistic chance that private
builders could be drawn to developing commercial projects in hopelessly blighted
areas.”130 On the other hand, “[w]ith more than 200 condemnations benefiting
private parties in the five years between 1998 and 2003, California is one of the
leading abusers of eminent domain in America.”131 “Proposals in other states,
including two brought forward in the California Legislature, even appear to have
been consciously designed, in the words of one commentator, as ‘disingenuous"
attempts’ to pretend to do something about eminent domain without actually
doing anything to upset the apple cart.”132
Of course, if RDAs were really concerned with eliminating true blight,
they should be lauded. But they are not so concerned, and nor could we possibly
expect them to be. CRL provides sticks, but few carrots to encourage RDAs to
actually do good by removing actual blight. TIF likewise provides maximum
payouts for eliminating the “blight that’s right,”133 and that rarely means true
blight. Instead we find that RDAs apparently have no real desire for eliminating
blight, but with drumming up whatever land they can assemble to attract big-box
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Id. at 994.
Sandefur, supra note 7, at 736.
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Id. at 706.
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See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 16 (“Corporate decisions once based on market
forces are now determined by which city’s redevelopment agency will cut the best deal.”). The
amount of corporate welfare given by California RDAs is astonishing: Wal-Mart has taken an
estimated $100 million, and Costco has taken $30 million from Orange County alone. Id. at 15.
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retailers.134 Surely RDAs would prefer to do this with the most economically
depressed areas; doing so would both eliminate blight and present lower up-front
assembly costs. But if these goals are only secondarily important to the primary
goal of generating more tax revenue, then RDAs will “search[] for ‘the blight
that’s right’—places just bad enough to clear but good enough to attract
developers.”135

In other words, “[w]hen program administrators [cannot]

legitimately find blight in areas with good prospects for redevelopment, they
fabricate[] it.”136
1. No “Naked Transfers” to Private Businesses: 99 Cents Only Stores v.
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency137
99 Cents illustrates precisely the problem with not maintaining adequate
separation between market and government and letting government agencies
function as if they were market participants. Market actors will unscrupulously
outsmart RDAs and strong-arm them into using the power of eminent domain for
their own advantage.

RDAs thus become, perhaps unwittingly, permanent

participants in market actors' machinations and power plays against one
another.138
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“Generally, governments undertake such projects on the theory that the more
profitable new use will create jobs, spur economic growth in the city, and ultimately raise the local
go
v ernment's tax revenue.” Sandefur, supra note 7, at 715-16.
135
Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 994–5.
136
Id. at 995.
137
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
138
See MORR Report, supra note 1, at 16 (describing how Cerritos engaged in “auto
dealer piracy,” and siphoned nearly all of neighboring Lakewood’s auto dealerships, earning itself
the nickname, the “‘Darth Vader of Cities.’”).
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In 1988, the Lancaster Redevelopment Agency used its powers of
redevelopment to “revitalize” the area in the “Amargosa Plan,” the cornerstone of
which was to be the “Power Center,” home to Costco, Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and
HomeBase.139

Costco moved into the Power Center in that same year and

proceeded to be very profitable for the next ten years. Then, in 1998, 99 Cents
moved into the vacant space next door to Costco and proceeded to do very
profitable business of its own, with sales in excess of $5 million in its first full
year.140 Lancaster openly expressed its affection for 99 Cents because of the
terrific sales tax revenues it generated for the city.141
Then, the great sleeping giant stirred: Costco decided to expand.
Although expansion was possible to the south of its existing facility, Costo did
neither consider this option nor approach 99 Cents to negotiate a buy-out of its
lease. Instead, having previously known the benefits of RDA-assisted expansion,
Costco went directly to the city of Lancaster and threatened to relocate to
neighboring Palmdale and to “leave the Lancaster store shuttered and unoccupied,
refusing to rent it to anyone else,”142 if it could not obtain 99 Cents’ property.143
Terrified at the prospect of losing “the city’s 800-pound gorilla,”144 the City
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99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1125 (C.D. 2001).
140
Id. at 1126.
141
Id.
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Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 6.
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99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
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Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 6.
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approved a development agreement to use its best efforts to acquire the property
and sell it to Costco for $1.00.145
The court ruled against the City. The City failed to renew its blight
findings, even though it had opportunity to do so at two separate occasions.146
The court noted that the City’s scheme “rest[ed] on nothing more than the desire
to achieve the naked transfer of property from one private party to another,”147
and that “the very reason that Lancaster decided to condemn 99 Cents’ leasehold
interest was to appease Costco.”148 The City’s failure to abide by the statutory
blight requirements barred it from exercising its eminent domain authority and
left its improper motives exposed to judicial reprimand.
Although the facts of this case were just plain rotten for Lancaster, could
our federal constitution, as interpreted under Kelo, have come to the same
conclusion and striking down the use of eminent domain? Probably not without a
sympathetic and “activist” court.149 The added evidentiary check of California’s
blight requirements ultimately exposed the greed and manipulation behind the
attempted land grab.
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99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. The author notes that $0.99 would have been more

poetic.
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Id. at 1125-26. In neither the 1994 plan amendment to extend TIF benefits nor the
1997 plan amendment to renew condemnation rights did the RDA bother to make new evidentiary
findings of blight. Id.
147
Id. at 1129.
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Id.
149
But see Kanner, supra note 53, at 383 (“The Constitution does not require courts to
facilitate predatory behavior by business-government alliances seeking to increase their cash flow
by depriving people of modest means of their homes. The Public Use clause is not ‘hortatory
fluff.’”).
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It is easy to be callous towards the City of Lancaster in its failed attempt to
establish blight. Noted one commentator, “Eight hundred-pound gorillas can be
tough to deal with, but sometimes it is best to just tell them to pipe down and eat
their bananas.”150 It is fun to quip at the situation, but we must not take this oversimplified conclusion seriously.

The city perhaps could not have done any

differently: it was forced to negotiate with the hostage-taker (Costco), and thus
had to demonstrate that it was doing everything in its power to fulfill the
demands. Although the court ultimately barred the transfer, if the City had not
been able to work out a separate agreement with Costco, Costco would have
moved to a neighboring city as it had threatened to do, and “killed” Lancaster’s
hostage (its sales tax revenues). This would have been a grave casualty. Thus the
judicial remedy is an unsatisfying solution. While it protects challengers in these
more egregious cases, it leaves cities unprotected from unscrupulous mega-taxgenerators like Costco who threaten to use the town’s own redevelopment tools
against it.151
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Michael M. Berger, supra note 107, at 8.
It starts to become clear that the City may have been an unwitting victim. Given the
tools to bring in an “800 pound gorilla” such as Costco, a city will naturally use them. If it does
not, the next town certainly will. Costco, realizing of course that Lancaster possesses the
awesome power of eminent domain, need only exert the correct amount of pressure to obtain that
power. “Future blight” is thus a very real danger for the city; it has invested millions in bringing
in its 800 pound gorillas, and if they leave it will very likely leave the area a shambles. This is
basic hostage negotiations strategy: a hostage-taker will only demand what he believes the
negotiator can provide. If the negotiator can make the hostage-taker believe that the negotiator
simply cannot provide what he wants, then the hostage-taker will not demand it. Thus 99 Cents
instructs that, to prevent Costcos from taking their respective cities' sales tax revenues hostage, it
need only be made clear that the power of redevelopment for such a purpose is off the table.
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2. More than Lip Service to Blight Requirements: Friends of Mammoth v.
Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency152
This case involved a community challenge to the RDA of the mountain
town of Mammoth after it sought to establish a redevelopment project area.153
The Town’s plan specifically authorized the RDA “to provide or participate in
providing at least 72 separate and identified public improvements and facilities”
and “400 new housing units.”154 Plaintiffs contended that the RDA had failed to
comply with CRL with respect to its blight findings, and with the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) in the Town’s Environmental Impact Report
(EIR).
The appellate court agreed with Plaintiffs, holding that the RDA had failed
to produce sufficient evidence to support its finding that the project area suffered
from physical conditions causing blight, and failed to show sufficient evidence
that the buildings were economically nonviable or that adjacent incompatible uses
prevented economic development.155 The court examined the Town’s evidence
regarding unsafe or unhealthy buildings.156 Although the Town provided building
surveys for the project area, the surveys failed to define what a violation entailed,
and how the violation could constitute blight under section 33031(a)(1).157 “The
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82 Cal. App. 4th 511 (2000).
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Town Council thus could not know whether the evidence of building code
violations demonstrated the existence of buildings that were unsafe or unhealthy
for human occupation, nor can we.”158 The court also reviewed the findings of
“deterioration and dilapidation.”159 The Town had pointed to houses that had
been “constructed with single glazed windows and electric heating” and rendered
them therefore to be unsafe.160 The Town pointed to “inadequate depths for retail
display” and energy inefficiency as evidence of “defective design and substandard
construction.”161 These claims did not pass the laugh test, and the court held that
this could not be found to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of the Code.162
Ultimately, the Town could not fool the court into believing that blight
removal was really its goal.

Blight is not merely an evidentiary hurdle; it

represents the finish line itself. It is the very point of redevelopment in the first
place. Before an RDA can get to its actual purposes of redevelopment, it must do
more than just play lip service to the state’s requirements. Because California’s
blight requirements are relatively strict, “the courts are required to be more than
rubber stamps for local governments.”163
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3. More than Merely Higher and Better Use: Beach-Courchesne v. City of
Diamond Bar164
In 1995, Diamond Bar, an affluent suburban community of pricey lowdensity housing and low crime,165 wished to increase commercial development.
To accomplish this, the City relied on its redevelopment powers and established a
1,300 area redevelopment project area.166 In its attempt to comply with CRL, the
City made findings that the area suffered from blight that was “‘so prevalent and
so substantial that it causes a reduction of, and a lack of, proper utilization of the
area to such an extent that it constitutes a serious physical and economic burden
on the community which cannot be expected to be reversed or alleviated by
private enterprise or governmental action, or both, without redevelopment.’”167
Here again the court found that the City did not satisfy its evidentiary
burden in showing blight.

The City pointed to “multiple ownership”168 as

evidence of physical blight, but the court rejected this claim, reasoning that “[t]he
mere fact of multiple ownership does not establish blight. Otherwise, a
condominium development by definition would be blighted.”169 The court found
the rest of the City’s evidence of blight wanting and invalidated the
170
redevelopment
plan.implicit
The City’s
reasoning is that the definition of blight should be

made to include not only the removal of uses that produce externalities, but uses
164

80 Cal. App. 4th 388 (2000).
Id. at 392.
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Id. at 393.
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that fall short of the highest and best theoretical use. The court rejected the
interpretation that a public use could be merely a more beneficial use, stating that
“the concededly desirable goal of improving an area is ‘insufficient by itself to
justify use of the extraordinary powers of community redevelopment.’”171
Following the instruction of the California Supreme Court, the court stated that it
would be “‘chary of the use of the [redevelopment] act unless . . . there is a
situation where the blight is such that it constitutes a real hindrance to the
development of the city . . . . It never can be used just because the public agency
considers that it can make a better use or planning of an area than its present use
or plan.’”172 And further, “[t]he CRL is not simply a vehicle for cash-strapped
municipalities to finance community improvements. If the showing made in the
case were sufficient to rise to the level of blight, it is the rare locality in California
that is not afflicted with that condition.”173
The decision in Diamond Bar assuages the fear that Justice O’Connor
articulated in her dissenting opinion in Kelo:
For who among us can say she already makes the most productive
or attractive possible use of her property? The specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the
State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.174
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Id. at 395 (quoting Regus v. City of Baldwin Park 70 Cal. App. 3d 968, 979 (1977)).
Id. at 395 (quoting Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn. v. City of National City 18 Cal. 3d
270, 278 (1976)) (emphasis added).
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The pragmatism of redevelopment is of great concern to California
attorneys such as Murray O. Kane.

Although Kane’s clients are typically

RDAs,175 he took on Diamond Bar’s RDA when it used “blight” as “simply a
vehicle . . . to finance community improvements.”176

Kane explained his

motivation for fighting the city of Diamond Bar: “If Diamond Bar gets away with
it, then California's reform legislation is greatly weakened, and a legislative
backlash could go beyond stopping redevelopment abuse, and will also hurt
redevelopment in truly blighted areas where redevelopment is really needed.”177
Kane is worried about a tragedy of the commons in a redevelopment context. If
the redevelopment powers are “over-harvested” such as to instigate serious
political revolt against them, they will become barren and useless, and will no
longer be available for the purposes for which they were intended and for which
they areKane’s
still needed.
remarks remind us that it is important for redevelopment
proponents to not only protect the formal redevelopment powers, but the
pragmatic foundations of its exercise. Cases like Poletown and Kelo have already
opened Pandora’s box, piquing citizens’ interest as to what redevelopment is all
about and whether they might fall prey to it. Without careful review in California
in such cases as 99 Cent Stores, Diamond Bar, and Mammoth Lakes, these

law] make it possible to declare property blighted whenever officials believe it is failing to
produce revenue at a level that they would like to see.”).
175
See Murray O. Kane—Biography, http://www.kbblaw.com/members_kane.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2006).
176
Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar, 80 Cal. App. 4th 388, 407 (2000).
177
Did Diamond Bar Conduct a $450 Million Raid on School Funds?, DIAMOND
BAR/WALNUT NEWS GAZETTE, May 1, 1999 (emphasis added).
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respective cities’ RDAs threaten to kill the golden goose of redevelopment. The
public has its eye trained on redevelopment agencies; will it abide the kinds of
choices RDAs have made in recent years?

V. AN ARGUMENT FOR REFORM
The idea, of course, is that RDAs are in power for the purpose of
eliminating blight so that redevelopment can happen. The misfortune of the
whole enterprise was perhaps in the nomenclature—a “redevelopment agency”
wants to do more than just eliminate blight: it wants to redevelop. Of course the
two things are inextricably linked. But the phenomena that began to occur was
that the primary focus left the sphere of blight removal and instead became the
redevelopment itself. This leads to RDAs searching not for the worst instances of
blight, but instead the “blight that’s right”178 and other opportunities to bring more
tax revenue—tax revenue which was supposed to be a nice fringe benefit of
redevelopment, but which has actually become the primary motivator. As a
result, we are in need of reform that reminds RDAs why they exist in the first
place. One way to do this might be to require greater evidentiary support of the
blight in each case. “[I]t was suggested to the legislative committees that they
more closely tie condemnation to conditions of blight by requiring redevelopment
agencies in resolutions of necessity to make parcel-specific findings of blight and
thereby link the proposed project to the blighting conditions identified by the
178
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agencies.”179 However, while this may help stem the tide of bad redevelopment,
we must correct the faulty incentive structure. The California legislature has
recognized some of the dangerous incentives that encourage bad redevelopment:
The state legislature recognized the irresistible attraction for
redevelopment agencies to lure big, tax-generating uses to vacant
sites, blighted or not. To remove this temptation, the legislature
banned automobile dealerships in redevelopment project areas
from being located on land never previously developed for urban
uses. Cal. Health & Safety Code 33426.5(a) (West 1999). The
legislature also banned development that would generate sales
taxes from being located on a parcel of land five acres or larger,
unless the principal permitted use was office, hotel, manufacturing,
or industrial. Cal. Health & Safety Code 33426.5(b) (West
1999).180
If it is really the case that RDAs simply cannot help themselves when it comes to
things like auto dealerships and Costcos, then instead of making provisions for
certain types of the particularly juicy earners, perhaps it is more sensible to
remove this insidious incentive altogether, instead of a piecemeal approach.
These types of exclusions illustrate the lack of principle in the approach to
redevelopment.181 Through such legislation, RDAs are still improperly motivated
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Tepper, supra note 11, at 42.
The way to address Kelo-type issues is to require a site-specific blight finding at
the time of the hearing on a resolution of necessity.
Those seeking redevelopment reform should base their proposals on
reported California decisions invalidating redevelopment plans and not upon
perceived abuses reported anecdotally by the press. Legitimate concerns exist
regarding the use of the blight statutes by agencies in recent reported decisions.
Nevertheless, real redevelopment reform will only occur if the legislature brings
a precise focus to its efforts.
Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
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Lefcoe, supra note 86, at 1003 n.61.
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This piecemeal approach has been used since 1975, when the California Law Revision
Commission, in response to the California Supreme Court’s abdication of review over legislative
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to eliminate real blight, but in the event that a project does eliminate real blight, it
is forbidden from installing a big earner like an auto mall. Thus they are told to
seek out higher and better uses, but not the highest and best use.
We might not even need eminent domain reform as much as we need
reform to the incentive structure and general mindset behind redevelopment.
Government cannot be expected to behave like a business because government is
subject to a different set of legal rules, rules that are not designed for fair play in a
market environment.

Thus a government redevelopment agency cannot be

designed to have revenue-generation as its prime directive. Government’s role in
a republic is generally corrective, not speculative.

Government’s job is to

manicure an environment that is conducive to successful private enterprise; it is
private individuals and businesses that must make a community succeed. That’s
not just good policy; it is in principle what a republic is.182 Government only
helps the market indirectly by providing services; market success cannot be
government's direct goal; this just leads to too great a temptation to abuse its
awesome powers. A snow plow makes roads navigable that were otherwise

California legislature finally annulled the Chevalier holding. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1245.255
(1982) (stating that resolution not conclusive when procured by “gross abuse of discretion”).
182
See Republic, 23 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 177 (1911).
[R]epublic has, however, always been understood to mean a state in which the
head holds his place by the choice of his subjects. . . . What, however, is
emphatically not a republic is a state in which the ruler can truly tell his subjects
that the sovereignty resides in his royal person . . . .
. . . [T]he community . . . [must] confine the head of the government to
defined functions.
Id.
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unnavigable. But to tool around in the snow plow in normal conditions puts much
unnecessary wear on the road, which will eventually become cracked and pitted,
unsafe and unsuitable for those whom the plow was intended to serve.
Cities can spot uses that are aggregate losers (blighted), and restore them
to point zero. The public use is satisfied in this.183 The subsequent hand off to
private development should be largely ancillary.

Cities may not, however,

identify properties that are not aggregate losers (not blighted), and call them
losers (blighted) by pointing to a better market function.

This creates

inappropriate government entanglement with free enterprise, a sphere in which
the players must not be permitted to capture and use the government's tools
against one another.184 It also overstates the role of government; when reasonable
and profitable use is being made of land, it is not for government to improve upon
it.185

Because an ill-conceived redevelopment regime allows rent-seekers to

blackmail cities, and entices cities to use coercive bargaining and offend
landowners’ sensibilities, RDAs are in danger of ruining the tools it needs to
achieve their true purpose of blight removal. We are on a road to revolt, and
while the revolt might restore a principled approach to eminent domain abuse—
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See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining how Michigan case law treats true blight removal as
a public use).
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See supra Part IV.D.1 (explaining how Costco captured the power of eminent domain
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and ostensibly provided needed protection to land owners—it will likely hurt
cities’ ability to provide for their own welfare. Thus we must remove the blight in
our redevelopment law, and redevelop the principles and policies underlying
redevelopment agencies, in order to save them from a demise of their own doing.

